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T

he first thing that people think when
they hear the term ‘game theory’ is most
likely to be ‘What is it?’, followed by
‘Why should I care?’. Game theory is a way
of analysing the choices we make when we
interact with others and how their choices
affect ours. If you interact with anyone, you
are playing a game.
Take the following instance. You and your
partner are deciding where to go for dinner
and you think that your vegetarian partner
is likely to choose the vegan Dendrophilia’s
Delights. However, your partner is flexible
and, as you are a committed carnivore, you
suggest Bob’s Burger Barn (even though you
would prefer Steve’s Steakhouse) because
Bob’s has that black-bean burger for your
partner and you can get the BBQ Bacon
Deluxe Burger. You have just played a game
where you tried to optimise the outcome for
the two of you (cooperative behavior), instead of insisting on the big win for yourself.
We will discuss four scenarios where
game theory applies to surgeons on a
personal level, a hospital/clinic level, in the
regional market, and in interactions with
the public. These scenarios illustrate the
prisoner’s dilemma game, the tragedy of the
commons, motivation for cheating in a cartel,
and the effect of asymmetric knowledge in
surgical markets.

Let’s look at a common situation in
operating theatres. A surgeon wants to add a
patient to the schedule but there isn’t enough
time left for his case. He wants the team to
agree to post the case but the team may not
agree. This is a classic example of what is
known as the prisoner’s dilemma game (PG).
In the classic PG, two prisoners are arrested
for a petty crime, but suspected of a much
more serious one. They know that the police
only have evidence of the minor crime and

People tend
not to act as
rationally as
required in the
mathematical
analysis of
game theory,
partly because
we value social
interactions
and the benefit
to others
that they face only a short time in jail if convicted (assuming they both cooperate and
keep silent). However, if one of them testifies
against the other (defects), that one will get
a much lighter sentence and the other will
get a heavy sentence. Knowing this, each
prisoner weighs up his options and thinks
that his best solution is to defect and testify,
resulting in both prisoners ending up with
worse outcomes than had they cooperated by
remaining silent.

In the operating theatre setting, the
surgeon may ‘defect’ by misleading the
team about the time needed, or complain to
hospital management to pressure the team.
Or, the operating theatre team can simply say
‘no’, instead of looking for ways to accommodate the surgeon. If both the surgeon and
the team defect, the patient gets delayed
and neither side is happy. If there was more
cooperation from both sides, they may have
been able to work out an arrangement that
would benefit all concerned. In real life, we
find that people tend not to act as rationally
as required in the mathematical analysis of
game theory, partly because we value social
interactions and the benefit to others.1,2
On a broader scale, a surgeon might ask
for an additional assistant for his or her clinic.
Should the clinic manager provide the extra
staff or not? Ultimately, the resources are finite and need to be allocated in some rational
way. Even if the costs of that extra staff are
somehow charged back to the surgeon, it is a
small cost relative to the gain if that surgeon
sees more patients. However, each additional
request for help or extra equipment erodes
the financial status of the clinic and makes it
less able to engage in strategic investments. As
the profit margin goes down, the return on
investment to parent corporation becomes so
small that the clinic is closed. In game theory,
this is known as the ‘tragedy of the commons’.
When sheep-herders add one more to their
flock grazing on the commons, there is an
incremental benefit – another fattened sheep
or a bit more wool to sell – for that individual.
However, the commons is degraded a bit by
the additional grazing. As more families add
that extra sheep, the commons is degraded
more and more until nothing is left. Although
the individuals initially benefit by getting that
extra bit from the commons, overuse eventually leads to the downfall of all.
In many markets there may be two or
more hospitals or health systems that are
competing for patients in a specific service
line. There is a finite market for those
services and the costs of providing care are
similar if the facilities are of a similar age,
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have similar supply costs, and have similar
labour costs. They could have an agreement
to evenly split the market (ignoring the legal
aspects of collusion). In Figure 1 we see the
market demand for services and the average
total cost at various levels of demand. The
optimal production is where the curve for
marginal revenue intersects the curve for
marginal cost of production. If the two hospitals were to collude and agree to split the
market share at this level of production, they
would maximise the profit of the system.
But what if one hospital were to cheat
and cut its price a bit to attract a few more
patients? It would make a bit less on average,
but still increase its total revenue. The
other hospital would try to do the same
and revenue per case would continue to go
down until there was no margin left. As
multiple providers enter the marketplace (eg
the growth of ambulatory surgery centres),
the likelihood of cheating increases because
‘in small groups reputation balances the
urge to cheat but, as players become more
numerous, reputation is less important and
the prospective gain from cheating becomes
larger’. 3,4 Cheating can drive the market
price down to where there is no margin left
for anyone.
Another aspect of game theory that
applies to surgeons is the role of asymmetric
information and its effect on quality. This is
particularly relevant to discretionary surgical procedures such as vision correction and
aesthetic procedures. Pricing to achieve the
desired volume and market share involves
game theory, as your choices depend on
the choices of others and how they respond.
Top-notch surgeons might be willing to
perform a procedure for $12,000, whereas
a so-so surgeon would be willing to take
$6,000. If consumers can’t tell the difference
between the high- and low-quality surgeons,
they might seek each out in roughly equal
numbers, leading to an average market price
of $9,000. However, at that price, the higher-quality surgeons are less likely to offer the
procedure, so there will be more lower-quality surgeons in the market.
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Suppose that at the price point of $9,000,
three-quarters of the procedures were offered
by the lower-quality surgeons and one
quarter by the high-quality ones. If the public
eventually figures this out, they might only
be willing to pay $7,500 for the procedure
(the weighted average of the $12,000 and
$6,000). But at that price, even fewer of the
top-quality surgeons would be willing to offer
the procedure, decreasing both the number
of providers offering the procedure and the
fraction of high-quality providers willing
to offer it. The trend is for lower-quality
products to force out high-quality ones in a
market where there is asymmetric information. Only if consumers have information on
quality can they make the informed decision
on pricing and value. Unfortunately, many of
the publicly reported quality measures fail to
portray true clinical quality (in part because
of the lack of risk-adjustment) so price-setting

for these discretionary procedures involves
both game theory and wild guesses as to
public reaction to available information.
Game theory plays an integral part in
our actions on a day-to-day basis. By understanding some of the basic principles, we can
guide our actions to optimise our outcomes
on many levels. This can have an impact
on our relationship with our partners, our
coworkers, employers, and the general public.
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